describe a method characterized by "uncompromising rationalism " and "deductive reasoning_ " Modern developments regarding natural law "metaphysical presuppositions" or other revisions of Catholic theological ethics by its more recent proponents pass by unremark ed .
The final selection of the book d ese rves special note. By dealing with the role of me dicine in society and with the e ffective and equitable distribution of m e dical resources, it raises social justice issues which have become particularly acute for Western medicine. Two authors, Charles Fried and Garvan Kuskey, take up the question of wheth er there exists a "right to health care." In so doing they address explicitly and commendably th e problematic conc ept of a " right" itself, a concept which has been crucial but submerged in other chapters, e.g., abortion and informed consen t.
This collection is a use ful one in that it directs our attention to a variety of well-informed and articulate discussions of medical e thics . Its particular value lies in the fact t hat it educates the read e r to examine these discussions critically. As the director of the research group on death and dying at the Hastings Center, Robert Veatch has gained immense knowledge and perspective on the topic of this book. The result has been this enormously valuable publication. Broad in scope, direct and stimulating in style, the book surveys the de finition and technology of death , the refusal of treatment, truth-telling, organ donation, and several related issues_ Each is presented in depth, w ith the end result being Veatch's conception of a Public Policy based on philosophical , social, a nd legal parameters that are easily understood, although undoubtedly debatable.
After a bri ef synopsis of the statistical data on dying and related costs, h e analyzes four levels in the definition of death debate: the formal analysis of the term ' death,' then the concept, locus, and criteria of d eath . He calls for "a public policy ... that will enable us to know who should be treated as alive and who should be treated as dead." (p. 55) He then compares four such policy proposals presently rec e iving consideration. On p. 76 he presents a valuable insight into the statutory difficulties, by formulating his own stature; th e emphasis is on the patient's pre-stated opinions, or those of nearest relatives. Veatch is consistently cautious to protect the individual 's rights and wishes.
The book is well documente d with legal case histories, including a complete analysis of the Karen Ann Quinlan case. He presents a thorough analysis of the 'Living Will,' pointing out deficiencies which few care to admit. He then presents his own guidelines toward the development of such a document_ Perhaps the most valuable asset of this book is its lack of relucta nce to offer precise positions on issues, most of which may polarize its readership. 1) "Terms November, 1977 such as 'brain death' or 'heart death' should be avoided because th ey tend to obscure the fact that we a re searching for the meaning of the death of the person as a whole." (p. 37) He analyzes such concepts as social integration and conscious· ness as criteria for life. " I ... beli eve that death is most appropriately thought of as the irreversible loss of the embodied capacity for social interaction." (p. 42) 2) "Physicians in the states that do not authorize brain·oriented criteria for pro· no uncing d eath who take it upon themselves to use those criteria .
•. . in my opin' ion, should be ... prosecuted." (p. 61) 3)" . . . most p eople writing in the fi eld ... are careless in distinguishing betwee n the whole brain and the cerebrum a nd t he functions of each." (p. 71) 4) If it is deemed that someo ne is in an irreversible coma and 'dead,' why d o physicians feel compelled to turn off the oxygenator before pronouncing d eath , then turn it on again to prese rve organs for tra nsplant? 5) "When we accept active killing of t he dying we are indeed stepping onto a slippery slope. We had b est know very well how to get off that slope short of crashing to the depth s of moral depravity." (p. 88) But he beli eves that "in so me individual cases, active inte rven tio n m ay still be m ora ll y defensible." (p. 93) 6) "I would propose adding 'ordina ry' and 'extraordinary' to 'euthanasia' as words that should be banned fro m further use. It is clearer simply to speak of morally imperative and elective m ea ns or of required a nd expandable means." (p. 110) He also warns agai nst the terms ' m eaningful ex iste nce' a nd 'dea th with dignity. ' 7)" .. . the decision to allow dying p atients to die or actively bring about their deaths should n ever be left to the individu al physician. " ( p. 172) He b eli eves that the physician "has no special competence for this kind of decision m a king ." (p. 183) "Physicians, at least nonpsychiatric phys icians, are not trained in determin· ing what is in t h e patient's interest. " ( p. 217) Although minor liabilities ex ist (suc h as the confusing Table 2 ) and a few debatable positions are presented, the book is an essential component of any library in m edical ethics. The reader is guid ed through a logical se quence of steps toward a Pu blic Policy, and is given the option of acceptance or repudiation. Whichever optio n is se lected, one is given the necessary legal, medical , and ethical bases for dec ision'making.
My one reservation, a nd it is n ot a strong o ne, is that in his emph as is on the patie nt's right to choose, Veatch does not allow enough room for the fact that d espondency a nd other temporary behavioral anomalies m ay induce a patie nt to ask for things which he does not really want. It is common for a p atie nt to ask to die, when in fact he really means "Please assure m e that it will not b e painful, " or "Please give m e comfort a nd just let m e talk ." -Paul R. 
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